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Abstract. Evidence has shown that maturity models are a popular means of assessing safety 
culture in organizations. Maturity models involve defining maturity stages or levels from less to 
more advanced safety cultures. A maturity model is a descriptive model in the sense that it 
describes essential, or key, attributes that would be expected to characterize an organization at a 
particular level. Existing culture maturity models still lacks a concise roadmap of strategies that 
can guide an organization to progress through the maturity stages from less to advanced. This 
work proposes a concept to integrate the present general and workplace models and techniques 
that provides a roadmap to generative safety culture. In doing so, a summary of the current 
general and workplace literature will be provided, method to integrate them to develop an 
integrated conceptual model for a generative safety culture, as well as the final integrated model 
is discussed. This conceptual model can be the basis for further research in order to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the safety culture improvement and maturity process. Lastly, 
implications for specific interventions to develop targeted safety culture improvement practices 
and work towards achieving generative safety culture will be discussed. 
1. Introduction 
The cultural aspects of safety have been one of the main focus in process industries to improve safety 
in the organizational settings. This is due in part to the findings of investigations into some major 
disasters in process industries (e.g. Texas City), other industries such as nuclear power (e.g. Chernobyl) 
and space travel (Challenger & Columbia), reported safety culture as one of the major causes. The term 
‘Safety Culture’ officially emerged from the initial analysis report of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant accident [1]. This analysis first time introduced safety culture as a concept, to manage safety in a 
more advanced way and to look beyond the direct engineering and technical failures by dwelling more 
deeply into the underlying causes of accidents. Most explicitly defined by HSE (2005) as: 
“Organisations with positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual 
trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by the confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive measures” [2]. 
 A lot of research is available what safety culture consists of and on application of performance 
measurement frameworks, [3-7], their influence on safety outcomes i.e., frequency of accidents or lost 
time injuries and as well as on the use of safety culture maturity models for assessment and multi-level 
characterization [8-9]. Mostly, these measurement methods and maturity models of safety culture lack 
motivation for continuous improvement and theoretical framework [8, 10-11]. These signs clearly direct 
us to move from the contemporary approaches and explore new strategies for continuously improving 
safety culture. 
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 In order to understand the nature of a continuously improving safety culture it is inevitable to know 
what are the most representative factors that make up a safety culture and how the factors can be 
identified, what steps should be done before embarking into a safety culture assessment, what strategies 
should be adopted to have an always monitoring and improving safety culture? 
The questions stated above calls for a simplified integrated process for development of a conceptual 
integrated framework that can help to identify steps towards a generative safety culture. Therefore, this 
paper focuses on the integration of general and workplace models relevant to selection process of most 
representative factors, methods of assessment and improvement strategies that can pave a way towards 
a continuously improvement safety culture.  
1.1. Selection of Factors for Safety Culture 
Identifying and selecting the most representative factors for safety culture is challenge, particularly those 
factors that help in proactively improving the safety culture. Since, these factors are the one that will be 
assessed, evaluated and applied across the organization settings, it requires organizations to develop 
deep knowledge and understanding of how and what methods can be used for the identification and 
selection process.  
 There has been a voluminous work done on identifying and selecting factors of safety culture. 
Selection process of factors depends on various types of statistical and analytical tools, methods such as 
linear or arithmetic mean, aggregate mean. Furthermore, the selection process also depends on type of 
industry and country. Depending on organizational setup some factors might be of importance in one 
while others factors in a different organization [12].  
 A meta-analytic study done by Flin et al. [13] , analysed 18 studies and came out with the five most 
common themes, that are, work pressure, management/supervision, risk, competence and safety system. 
Similarly, Seo et al. [14], suggested that there are five main factors of safety culture, co-worker safety 
support, management commitment to safety, supervisor’s safety support, competence level of 
employees with regard to safety and finally employee participation in safety-related decision making 
and activities. While in meta-analytic study by Clarke [15], analysed 16 studies and performed factor 
analysis and extracted the dominant themes common across the studies and he ended up with five main 
categories, i.e. Work task/work environment, Management attitude, Management actions, individual 
responsibility and involvement, and lastly safety management system. A literature review of 10 studies 
conducted by Wiegmann et al. [16], identified five indicators of safety culture  namely, reporting system, 
management involvement, rewarded system, employee empowerment, and organizational commitment. 
Farrington et al. [17] after reviewing 15 studies, identified reporting system, management commitment, 
immediate supervisors and supervisor sub-ordinate relationships, involvement, competency, training, 
attitude, behaviour rules, procedures and communication were the common factors. A report prepared 
for the Health and Safety Executive, 2005 (HSE) identified two-way communication, leadership, 
involvement of staff, existence of learning culture and existence of just culture as five core dimensions 
[15]. The summary shows that no strict consistency in the factorial structure and no definitive set of 
factors has been reported.  
1.2. Methods of Safety Culture Assessment 
Safety culture can be assessed using different Safety Culture assessment tools. The assessment tool gives 
response on how well some organizational factors related to safety are working and what factors need 
to be improved and the effect of attitudes and behaviours on frequency of accidents or other safety 
outcomes. The most common assessment method being used are listed as: 
a) Universal Assessment Instrument (UAI)  
b) Safety Element Method (SEM)  
c) Self-Diagnostic OHS Tool 
d) Tripod Delta 
The essential features of these methods are tabulated as follow in table.1. 
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Table 1. Safety performance related methods 
Method Author Objective No. of Elements Safety Outcome 
SEM  B.Alteren, 1998 
[11] 
Evaluation and 
improvement of 
OSH management 
performance 
Six key elements:  
management, feedback 
systems and learning, safety 
culture, documentation, 
results, goals and ambitions 
lost time injuries 
frequency, and a 
severity rate of 
injuries 
UAI Redinger and 
Levine, 1998 
[18] 
Evaluate the 
performance of 
OSH Management 
System 
Consists of 27 sections, 118 
OSH MS principles, and 486 
measurement criteria 
 
Nor reported 
Self-
Diagnostic 
OHS Tool 
Cadieux et al., 
2006, [19] 
Subjective self-
evaluation of OSH 
MS performance 
Nine subject areas namely: 
organizational systems, 
prevention-oriented 
activities, management 
commitment, organizational 
structures, employee 
responsibility, norms and 
behaviours, communication, 
continuous improvement, 
and workplace compliance 
The need for 
alteration to attain 
a satisfactory 
validation level 
Tripod Delta Cambon et al. 
2006 [20] 
Accident are 
prevented by 
identifying weak 
areas in working 
environment 
Questionnaire-based tool, 
with 1500 validated 
questions 
Corrective actions, 
the improvement 
of communication 
between the 
management staff 
and employees 
 
 
All these methods are being validated, provide basic theoretical framework and provide relation between 
technical, organizational and human. Furthermore, these assessment methods can be used in different 
work settings and have the ability of motivation for safety improvements. [10].   
1.3. Safety Culture Maturity Model 
Maturity Models consists of maturity stages which assess the completeness of a process in an 
organization by using a different sets of criteria [8-21]. Westrum [22-23],  proposed a concept that there 
exist a different level of cultures within an organization. He proposed three different organisational 
cultures, which he called pathological, bureaucratic and generative. The most immature stage of 
organisation has a pathological culture, which is one in which information is hidden, failure is covered 
up, new ideas are actively crushed and discouraged, sharing and learning from each other is actively 
discouraged. In such a culture, organization do not spend time risk management and safety issues.  
A next higher-level in organisational culture is the bureaucratic one that handles the flow of 
information in a systematic way but may probably then be ignored, new ideas to improve the safety are 
seen to create problems, and learning and sharing might be listened but not encouraged. The generative 
organisation characterizes the most progressive stage of cultural maturity. Here information is actively 
pursued, and there are trained safety staff members collect it. New ideas are being appreciated and 
welcomed, and failures are promptly investigated rather than cover-up or blame. Westrum’s tripartite 
typology was later modified to a five-level model and adapted by Parker and Hudson [24] specifically 
by adding up a reactive, and proactive level, and replacing the label bureaucratic with calculative with 
respect to safety culture (figure 1). 
Reports from many accidents investigations reveals that the approach to safety within the industries 
in general is mostly 'reactive'. Organizations with reactive approach to safety adjust their safety policies 
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after an event has occurred. At calculative level, organizations have systems in place to manage all 
possible risks, and learn to use the information they possess to manage safety professionally [24].  
Proactive organizations look actively for safety gaps in the system and places safety as a priority before 
injury or incidents occur. At this level, organizations comply with safety performance standards, have 
clear safety objectives and there is active safety participation at all levels of management [25].  
 
 
Figure 1. HSE Safety Culture Maturity Model [24]. 
1.4. PDSA Cycle for Safety Improvement 
The PDSA method focuses on the translation of ideas and intentions into learned and informed actions. 
The PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) is a tool that has been used widely by healthcare for quality 
improvement projects and bring positive changes in the processes effecting favourable outcomes [26-
30]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Demings’ PDSA Cycle [31]. 
The PDSA cycle, shown in figure 2, is a model for learning and improvement of a product or a process. 
The brief description of the key components of the model are:  
a) The very first step is ‘Plan’ a change, clear objectives, or test, aimed at improvement.  
b) The second step is ‘Do’ that is, carry out the change or test. 
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c) The third step is ‘Study’ the results of the second step. The core objective of this step is to study 
or analyse the data and the process itself. Some critical questions in this step are: 
• Did it work out as planned? 
• What were the lessons learned? 
d) The last step is ‘Act’. Act is a vital element that ensures what measures and procedures are 
available to adopt the change or abandon it. Also enquiring on the state of readiness to make 
another change, which leads on to generating a plan for the next PDSA cycle.  
The PDSA model is flexible, holistic in nature and easy to learn and use. The model supports continuous 
improvement efforts in a full range from the very informal to the most complex. It can be used to 
improve a new product line and for services improvements in a major organization setting.  
2. Methodology 
Based on the gaps and similarities of both the general and workplace models discussed above will help 
to build a new conceptual framework. The data collection for developing framework was done in five 
stages. 
 
i. First Stage: It is the primary stage which describes the process and phenomenon of identifying 
and selecting different models from the existing literature. 
ii. Second Stage: The data is structured together in new ways. Identifying a fit model from general 
or workplace models by looking deeply into identifying relationships between selected models. 
The goal is to make distinct connections between different dimensions, known as the “paradigm 
model”. This stage helps in understanding and explaining the relationships between different 
categories of the models and helps to understand the phenomenon or dimensions to which they 
relate. 
iii. Third Stage: This stage involves the integration of all the processes related to each model based 
on the similarities and overlapping features. 
iv. Fourth Stage:  This stage is systematically finalizing the overall integrated framework and the 
processes for the new model. 
v. Fifth Stage: The final stage is validation and justification of the framework based on literature-
based evidence provided. 
 
The criterion to develop the integrated conceptual model is general or work place models shall be from 
different disciplines, including Occupational Health and safety management system, Safety culture 
assessment methods, Safety Culture Maturity Models and process improvement studies. The criterion 
not only offers new perspectives but increases the validity of the conceptual integrative framework by 
bringing together evidence from different disciplines. The search was to find simple methods or models 
and found a total of three general and workplace models which met the above criteria. Different stages 
of the process are described as below in table 2. 
 
Table 2. General and Workplace Models 
No.  Andersen [32] OGP [25] Brett & Jeffrey [33] 
 
1.  Plan Establish implementation team Safety Culture Assessment 
2.  Do Assess performance Analysis of Assessment & Survey Results 
3.  Study Confirm critical process and barriers Recommended Practice Selection 
4.  Act Monitor weaknesses Implementation Plan 
5.   Set improvement actions Safety Culture Assessment 
6.   Regular monitoring Analysis of Assessment & Survey Results 
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3. Discussion 
3.1. Conceptualizing the integrated framework for generative safety culture 
Based on findings from literature, a conceptual framework for generative improvement of safety culture 
is developed by utilizing various stages discussed in section 2. This conceptual Model is not proposed 
to be a final rigid structure for application purposes but is rather a flexible mean to provide guidance for 
discussion and further research. Further, the different stages in framework model are being discussed as 
follow. 
▪ Plan for Safety Culture Objectives. The goal towards a generative safety culture is the 
continuous monitoring and improvements on every aspect of safety culture. Some main steps 
are discussed as below: 
▪ Before embarking on an intervention for safety culture, the very first critical step is to ensure 
what being measured is specific, representative and relevant to the system. A better solution is 
to select vast set of factors based on validated studies. A Delphi method can be used to get 
experts opinion in the field for building up consensus on given set of factors. Analytical 
Hierarchy process (AHP) can be used to prioritize, or choose the most relevant and 
representative set of factors based on their importance by a definitive criterion while ANP 
(Analytical Network Process) can be used to find the structural influence.  
▪ Identification of causal and influential effect in between the factors serves as a basis to track 
path for accidents before it happens by detecting deficiencies, errors and gaps in the safety and 
at the same time serves to design strategies to fill up the safety gaps and proactively improve 
the safety. Methods such Fuzzy Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (F-
DEMATEL) [34] and Analytical Network Process (ANP) [35], can be used to identify the 
influential and improvement paths. The benefit of using such methods that it can convert the 
relations between cause and effect of factors into a visual structural model, but also can be used 
as a way to handle the inner dependences within a set of factors. 
▪ Review in detail the factors that are to be selected and compared across an organization. 
Systematically understand how these factors can be used to conduct a safety culture assessment 
in the company. 
▪ Find partners in the same field, acknowledge them and obtain their acceptance for embarking in 
the progressive journey or identify inter-organizational departments for improvements and 
learning process.  
3.1.2. Do the safety Culture assessment process. Establish a team to carry out the safety culture 
assessment process throughout the whole organization from top management to bottom personnel. 
Conduct the inter-organizational or intra-organizational safety culture assessment for benchmarking 
purposes, which serves as improvement strategies. The process of benchmarking is more than just a 
means of gathering data on how well a company performs against others. Benchmarking is the process 
by which companies look at the “best” in the industry and try to imitate their styles and processes. This 
helps companies to determine what they could be doing better. Since, organizations progress 
sequentially through the maturity stages, by building on the strengths and re- moving the weaknesses of 
the previous levels the assessment process shall be designed in a way to carry out the safety culture 
maturity status. 
3.1.3. Study the Results. The effectiveness of safety culture data as a tool for safety improvement 
requires processes for developing a shared organizational understanding of the underlying meanings and 
causes, and it also requires processes for identifying the range of potential actions relevant to those 
interpretations. Rather than viewing the assessment results as an end point, the information should be 
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considered the starting point from which action and organizational safety changes emerge. Analyze the 
results from the assessment process helps identify strategies, set safety targets and key success areas for 
safety improvement. The safety areas identified as problematic can provide material for further analysis 
of underlying ‘‘root causes’’ and for generating improvement ideas from staff directly involved in the 
issues. Benchmark the process for inter-organizational and intra-organizational improvements. Data 
from safety culture assessments can be used to compare units within one organization or to examine 
differences across different organizations or systems. 
3.1.4. Act on the improvement plan. Improvements strategies developed and acted upon based on the 
findings from the observation and analysis of the safety culture assessment and benchmarking partners. 
Regularly monitor the action plan, as it can be a basis for learning and speeding up positive 
developments and can be considered a promising step in improving safety culture.  The outcomes at this 
stage can be used for the next assessment study with the purpose of continuous improvements and to 
learn from others as a basis for developing measures and programs which are aimed at increasing their 
own performance. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptualizing the Integrated Framework for Generative Safety Culture 
4. Conclusion 
Our review of general and workplace models offers a new perspective into developing an integrated 
conceptual framework model for generative safety culture. PSDA model, OGP’s KPI selection model, 
Safety culture improvement map fulfilled the criteria to be included in the study. As shown in figure 3, 
we propose an integrated conceptual model for generative safety culture. The integration process utilizes 
and explains the relationships and the overlapping features of PSDA model, OGP’s KPI model and 
Safety Culture improvement map. By integrating work from different sources, we have systematically 
structured different concepts and related them to each other.  The paper therefore has a theoretical 
contribution by combing different areas of research into a more comprehensive model. 
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The paper also discusses the critical importance of various steps and strategies that can guide an 
organization to progress through maturity stages from less to advanced. 
The principal contribution of this paper is to provide a comprehensive integrated conceptual model for 
a generative safety culture. This is a flexible framework model and the various steps involved can be 
modified and accordingly validated using expert’s opinion for further research or practical study.  
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